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Article 2

COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS-MAY 10, 2009 °
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY

0

As a former Attorney General, but even more as a former judge,
it is a special privilege to be invited to speak at a law school that has
trained so many members of both the state and federal judiciary,
which speaks volumes about the quality and concern for public
service that are as characteristic of this university as Carolina bluewhich, by the way, never looked as beautiful as it did against
Michigan State. This university, and this law school, have a history of
inviting speakers who reflect diverse views on important legal and
public policy issues, even when those speakers and views may present
matters of controversy. That history is consistent with what elevates
American legal education, and in particular the legal education
provided here, above mere indoctrination and makes it worthy of
being regarded not simply as career training but as education, and
indeed higher education.
Commencement speakers traditionally are expected to offer bits
of wisdom and guidance to the graduates, but I think that the usual
wisdom and guidance are something one should not presume to offer
others generally, and particularly not law school graduates, as you
are. Your skills and training not only equip you, but in a sense
obligate you, to find your own way of being true to yourselves and
your profession. All one can ask is that lawyers, as we are, recognize
that since law is a profession, it has to profess something. And one
important thing it professes is that lawyers are obligated to learn
enough about the hardest subjects and questions so as to confront
them as honestly and intelligently as they can when they must provide
answers or advice. The way I plan to put a little flesh on that rather
bare-bones observation is by referring to the subject that-oddly-I
found most surprising and challenging about being Attorney General:
the nature and scope of the terrorist threat we confront. As a federal
district judge I had presided over several terrorism-related matters,
and so I thought I knew something about that subject before I went to
Washington. But as Attorney General, every morning I received a
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classified briefing on the various threats our nation and others faced;
up to my last day in office those briefings were simultaneously
sobering and alarming. The enemies we faced, and still face, have a
presence literally in every part of the globe. Yet in many places they
are virtually undetectable, and the plots that were the subject of those
briefings were both creative and deadly.
I say this not because I think I am standing before people who do
not know the gravity of the terrorist threat, but rather to underscore
that because this is not a conventional struggle against a conventional
enemy with an identifiable location, on a particular and identified
battlefield, the main weapon we have in this war is intelligence. As
will become apparent later in these remarks, gathering information
for intelligence purposes is a lot different from gathering information
for purposes of presenting evidence at a trial, and in that difference
lies a great deal of the controversy we are witnessing and
participating in today.
The topic is of particular relevance, and I hope interest, to you as
graduating lawyers, presenting as it does the most significant
challenge to our legal system in our times. It is no surprise that
questions about how to confront that challenge have generated
vigorous debates, presenting, as they do, questions that are among the
most difficult a democratic government can face: how we as a nation
should seek to protect ourselves; whether the steps we take are
proportional to the threat and consistent with our history and
principles; where the legal lines are drawn in this new kind of conflict;
and, as a matter of policy, how close to those legal lines we should go,
and whether the lines themselves can be or should be redrawn.
Over the last three years, you have studied legal and policy issues
in part by considering cases that present those issues, whether
hypotheticals or real cases. At the risk of intruding on the day that is
supposed to represent the end of law school, I would like to consider
with you a case that illustrates several legal issues we now face. It is
the case of a man named Jose Padilla, who, as it happens, is an
alumnus of my courtroom, among others.1 After the 9/11 attacks,
1. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426
(2004). Other motions made in the Southern District of New York include Padilla ex rel.
Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying the government's motion
to dismiss for lack of standing and finding that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was the
proper respondent rather than the President); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 256 F.
Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting government's motion to certify interlocutory
appeal). For South Carolina and Fourth Circuit cases, see Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d
678 (D.S.C.), rev'd, Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
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Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network set about planning new
waves of attacks. Jose Padilla was supposed to be one of the
participants in those planned attacks. Mr. Padilla, as it happens, was
an American citizen and a convicted felon who-after he served his
jail sentence-journeyed abroad, where he acquired several aliases
and a new career: he enrolled in al Qaeda training.
Now I could spend a good deal of time on his itinerary, the
details of the training he received, and what BlackBerry users might
describe as the contact list he acquired on the way, but I will simply
summarize, not only for the sake of time but also because some of the
details of his exploits and those of his cohorts frankly are not in the
spirit of the day, and in any event are not crucial to this discussion.
After Padilla was recruited, he was trained in 2000 and 2001 in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, in various subjects, including how to blow
up apartments and the buildings containing them in a particular way.
He also developed a fascination for the idea of an improvised nuclear
weapon, later toned down to a relatively primitive device using
uranium wrapped in conventional explosives to create a so-called
dirty bomb, which creates not much in the way of explosion, but a
great deal in the way of radiation.
By April of 2002 he was ready to travel to the United States. On
this odyssey, he had met and won the confidence of a virtual dream
team of world-class terrorists. One member of that team was Abu
Zubaydah, a close associate of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, sometimes
known by his initials KSM, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and the
man who murdered Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Padilla
was eventually matched up with a would-be accomplice, who never
made it to the United States, a man named Binyam Mohammed.
We'll get back to him in a few minutes.
But first, let's continue to follow Mr. Padilla's journey, picking
up with the eve of his departure to the United States, when he was
hosted at a dinner attended by a man I mentioned a moment ago,
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, another man who acted as
personnel organizer for the 9/11 attacks, and yet another individual
who acted as KSM's right-hand man. These three men provided

1062 (2006). Related Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court motions include Padilla v. Hanft,
432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying government's motion to transfer and to vacate);
Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006) (granting government's application respecting the
custody and transfer of Jose Padilla). For Florida and Eleventh Circuit cases, see United
States v. Padilla, No. 04-CR-60001, 2006 WL 2415946 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2006), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2007).
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Padilla with U.S. currency, a cell phone, and travel documents. And,
of course, dinner.
Padilla arrived at Chicago's O'Hare Airport on May 8, 2002. He
was carrying much of the cash his dinner hosts had provided, the cell
phone they also provided, and the names and telephone numbers of
his al Qaeda recruiter and sponsor. Padilla was arrested when he
landed on a warrant I had issued in New York, based on information
contained in an affidavit. That information came in part from the
harsh interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, one of the high-ranking al
Qaeda members I mentioned a moment ago. The warrant I issued for
Padilla was what is called a material witness warrant, which you may
have learned in criminal procedure, and which I pointed out
specifically to the prosecutor, can be used only to detain someone
until he can provide testimony before a grand jury or a trial jury, and
may not be used simply as a substitute for indefinite detention.2
When it was clear Padilla would not testify against his cohorts, he
was transferred on order of the President to military custody as an
unlawful enemy combatant, which was a designation that was not
invented in 2001 but was a designation that had long applied to
anyone who did not fight in uniform, participate in a recognized chain
of command, carry weapons openly, and refrain from targeting
civilians. Oddly, many in government no longer refer to such people
as unlawful enemy combatants, but instead as "individuals captured
or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and
counterterrorism operations."3 Whether this adds clarity to the
discussion or not I leave it to you to decide, but the term "unlawful
enemy combatants" was the same one that had been applied to Nazi
saboteurs who landed during World War II off the coasts of Florida
and New York-one of whom claimed to be and was assumed by the
Supreme Court to be an American citizen, like Padilla. They were
rounded up, tried by a military tribunal in Washington on direct order
of President Franklin Roosevelt (even though the civilian courts were
open and functioning), convicted, and executed-a process that was
upheld by the Supreme Court in a case called Ex parte Quirin.4
Padilla challenged his detention; I upheld it based largely on the
Quirin precedent. One court of appeals disagreed with me, the
Supreme Court held that Padilla had filed his habeas petition in the
wrong court, and another court of appeals eventually found he was
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 27,2009).
4. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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properly detained-kind of a mixed bag. Eventually, Padilla was
transferred back to civilian custody and charged in an indictment with
the plot to blow up apartment buildings, convicted, and sentenced to
more than seventeen years in prison. He was never tried in
connection with the so-called dirty bomb plot.
As law students, you were probably told that spotting issues is
the main skill you have to show on final exams, so let's review this
brief and somewhat sanitized history and spot some issuesconstitutional law, evidence, criminal procedure, the limits of
executive power, to name only a few legal issues. And there are policy
issues as well, related but quite distinct from the legal issues.
Issue one, of course, is presented by the harsh interrogation
methods used on some of al Qaeda's captured leaders. I say "harsh"
advisedly, not "enhanced" or some other term that represents a
verbal flinch from reality. I do not intend to get into any debate about
that or any related issue here. But I should simply point out to you
that when you have custody of someone you have every reason to
believe has more information than he has disclosed using
conventional interrogation methods-information that can be used to
save lives-then unless you think Khalid Sheikh Mohammed had the
intention of retiring after 9/11 and his other achievements to deliver
after-dinner speeches, the questions of what you may lawfully do and
should do to elicit information from such a person, and what you may
not do under any circumstances regardless of who you are dealing
with, are not easy ones. And they are not made easier by using
language that either conceals or exaggerates what is at stake. How far
you may go in any case, and what you may not do in any case, are
both legal issues that are at least susceptible of an answer based on a
statute, even though that answer may be debated. How far you should
go, even as to conduct that may be legally permissible, is a matter of
policy, often less susceptible of a firmly rooted answer. What should
provoke no debate, however, is that, as I mentioned before,
intelligence gathering for national security purposes is very different
from evidence gathering for trial purposes.
That raises a second issue: how would you go about proving facts
in a courtroom? You can't do it based on what was discovered only
from intelligence gathering, and not simply because of objections to
interrogation methods, but rather because such evidence is not
admissible against any person questioned who has not knowingly
given up his Fifth Amendment rights, and generally is not admissible
against anyone else because hearsay is not admissible. In any event,
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every defendant has the right under the Sixth Amendment to
confront the witnesses against him.
There are also practical reasons-and these are policy reasonswhy you can't in an ordinary courtroom use proof from other
intelligence sources because it can't be disclosed, whether because
doing so would endanger a person's life, or would reveal a clandestine
method of intelligence gathering, or would give up information
received from a foreign country's intelligence agency that turned the
information over only on the express understanding that the source
would never be disclosed. Again, the rules of evidence, which bar
hearsay, and the Sixth Amendment, which requires that a defendant
be permitted to confront the witnesses against him, would prevent the
use of a great deal of intelligence information, and did in Padilla's
case. He was convicted of the exploding apartments plot based on
evidence independent of classified intelligence information.
The third issue is broader than the second: what kinds of
proceedings can be held in such cases? Padilla eventually was tried in
a public Article III courtroom based on proof that could pass the
rigorous test of the rules of evidence, but only for the plot to blow up
apartment buildings, not for the dirty bomb plot. That one couldn't
be proved in a conventional trial where a defendant has access under
conventional discovery rules not only to what evidence the
government has but also how it is gathered. That can be very costly to
national security even from information that is quite conventional. In
a terrorist conspiracy case I tried in 1995, the government was
required to turn over to the defendants, as it is in all conspiracy cases,
a list of unindicted co-conspirators. That list included one name that
few people recognized in 1995: Osama bin Laden. It was later learned
that, shortly after the government turned over that list, it made its
way to Khartoum, where bin Laden then lived. Our rules of criminal
procedure, which we all had to and did follow, allowed bin Laden to
learn not only that his identity was known but also which of his
colleagues' identities were known.
It was partially for that and similar reasons that both houses of
Congress and the President approved a system of military tribunalscourts not covered by the rigors of Article 1I1.5 Such tribunals are now
suspended, perhaps to be abandoned in favor of civilian courts, or
some hybrid tribunal of a kind proposed by some scholars, but
perhaps not. According to press reports, that is still being debated.
What rules of evidence and procedure will apply in such courts? If
5. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
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such courts are not subject to the rigors of Article III, that would
appear to be a policy question. If it is an Article III court, the Sixth
Amendment, which guarantees defendants the right to confront the
witnesses against them, will apply, which would mean that unless the
soldier who captured a detainee could be summoned from the
battlefield to testify to the capture, the case might be thrown out. And
also under the Sixth Amendment, not only would the accused be
guaranteed the right to counsel, but he would also be guaranteed the
right to represent himself if he chooses. That would mean that
accused terrorists would have the right of access to all the discovery
that the government must provide in such a case. There is perhaps a
realistic danger that some detainee might decide to represent himself,
get access to discovery, and then try to share it with others, whether
in or out of custody. Is that a risk we should take? Would we prefer to
dismiss charges and release people rather than let that happen? And
where would we release them? Those last three are policy questions.
Next issue: I mentioned at the beginning of these remarks that
Mr. Padilla had an accomplice, an accomplice who received the same
extensive training Padilla did, was financed by al Qaeda just as Padilla
was, and who was dispatched to the United States just as Padilla was.
But there were some important differences between the two. The
accomplice was not a U.S. citizen; he was an Ethiopian who had lived
for several years in Great Britain. And he never made it to the United
States. He was captured in Pakistan and eventually transferred to the
naval facility at Guantanamo Bay, where he was detained for about
six years. The accomplice was charged with war crimes and would
have been tried by a military tribunal if his case had continued in the
course set out in legislation.
But it did not, and thus there is another crucial difference
between that accomplice and Jose Padilla. While Padilla is serving a
lengthy sentence, his would-be accomplice, unlike Jose Padilla, is a
free man. He was never tried by a military commission and was never
transferred to the civilian courts. Although his detention simply as an
unlawful enemy combatant was entirely proper under the law and
supported by strong evidence, he was freed due to international
complaints relating to his allegations of abuse that were not alleged to
have occurred at Guantanamo. He is now living in Britain, reportedly
on public assistance. Regardless of whether those complaints and
similar ones are valid, they are real. The struggle against terrorism is
global, which means that if our allies have concerns, they have to be
taken seriously. And so, whether you agree with it or not, a policy
choice was made to release him.
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And, of course, the next issue: where would we try detainees, if
we did try them at all, and perhaps release them, if their cases are
turned over to civilian courts? Recall that those in custody are, in
general, aliens who have no right to enter this country, and until a
case called Boumediene, had virtually no rights under domestic law if
they were held abroad, and indeed, if they were enemy combatants,
even if they were held here. Recall also that under existing
immigration laws, any person shown to have trained in terrorist
training camps is barred from entering this country for that reason
alone, regardless of whether or not their training was targeted
specifically at this country.6 Does it uphold the rule of law to bring
such people to this country and release them? Certainly, it does not
uphold the immigration laws.7
Recall as well that in our history we have fought wars and held
for detention until the conclusion of hostilities literally millions of war
prisoners, some of them here, and until Boumediene there was no
suggestion that habeas corpus rights, or rights indistinguishable from
habeas rights, applied to such detainees.8 Those were, and still are,
legal questions.
Of course, there are those who dispute whether we are indeed in
a war, in part because although we have always fought wars that at
some point were of indefinite duration, they always had at least a
clear ending scenario, with the capture of enemy territory, or a
ceremonial surrender. But this war offers only the prospect of
ongoing resistance and vigilance until the opposition loses its taste for
the struggle. Some will not refer to a war at all, but instead call it a
military contingency operation, and will not refer to terrorism but
rather only to "man-caused disasters."
We could at any time declare that we are not in a war. That
would not change the view of our adversaries, who declared
themselves to be at war with us in the 1990s, and proved it, with the
first World Trade Center attack in 1993, with the bombing of
Americans at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, with the attack on the
USS Cole and the attempted attack on another destroyer, with the
attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and so on. We
responded to each of those with conventional criminal prosecutions,
and then, of course, came the September 11, 2001 attacks.

6. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
7. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103,119 Stat. 302, 306-09.
8. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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You who aspire to be judges, defense lawyers, members of the
executive or legislative branch, prosecutors, lawyers of any kind, may
wish to ponder the question raised earlier, whether or not we need a
different system of courts for such a conflict, and if so, how would it
differ from a conventional Article III court. If necessary, how can we
create it? This involves both legal and policy choices. All of these
legal questions must be resolved in ways that are consistent with our
Constitution and other laws, and the policy questions in ways that are
also consistent with our values and interests.
Throughout these remarks I have tried to separate out legal and
policy issues, and I think for good reason. Any good lawyer who
understands that the decisions he or she makes may be scrutinized in
the future will understand that, as to legal questions, that lawyer has
no alternative except to do law. Hard though it may be, a good lawyer
must be indifferent to the fact that the lawyer may well be criticized
whatever the decision. It is the task of the good lawyer to tune out all
this noise, to give the best reading within the lawyer's ability of what
the law is, and not to confuse what the law is with what that lawyer, or
someone else, thinks the law ought to be. If the lawyer's best reading
of the law permits some policy, there is a professional obligation to
say that it would be lawful, even if the lawyer personally disagrees
with it, or recognizes that it may one day prove controversial. Just as
important-perhaps more important-if the lawyer believes that
some policy would be unlawful, there is a professional obligation to
say "no," even if some people think the policy is desirable or even
critical. The rule of law, and the oath every public servant takes to
support and defend the Constitution, depend on it. And law, it must
be remembered, is not simply an empty vessel into which a lawyer
pours his or her opinions on matters of policy.
Although only some of you are likely to become public servants,
and some lesser number to deal directly with these precise dilemmas,
the responsibility to do law will apply to each of you. The lawyer in
private practice must not confuse the client's interest with the law; if
"no" is the right answer the obligation is to say no, even if the client
doesn't want to hear it. The lawyer pursuing the public interest must
not confuse the lawyer's own views of what the law ought to be with
what the law is. And the lawyer in robes-as I once used to be, as
many graduates of this fine school are, and as some of you no doubt
will be-like the image of justice blindfolded, must decide cases, as
the federally prescribed judicial oath says, "without respect to
persons," an interesting formulation. That is, without regard to who
the parties are or what outcome might be well received in some
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quarters, but based on the judge's best reading of what the law
requires.
I have not here suggested answers to any of these questions,
although obviously I have views on some of them, some such views
already expressed and others not. Today I have simply done what
each of you graduating today has been asked to do on final exams
over the course of your law school careers: I have spotted some
issues. A few are straightforward legal issues, and can be resolved by
consulting the law; others are policy issues which should not be
confused with or dressed up as legal issues. You, and other graduates
across the nation, will help resolve those issues, and hopefully keep
separate the legal issues and the policy issues.
On a final exam, spotting issues alone can get you a high grade.
But in the real world, it can't. Difficult issues have to be resolved, and
your training over the last three years-in recognizing and drawing
distinctions between law and policy, in separating real differences
from bogus ones, in understanding legal principles and the enduring
values and practical ends they are supposed to serve-will be
absolutely essential if we are to resolve these issues in a way we can
all live with. I mean that in all senses of that phrase, including being
able to abide the result as moral beings, and being able to keep
ourselves and our neighbors safe. Here it is useful to bear in mind the
lesson taught by a French philosopher named Pascal, who said that
the first rule of morality is to think clearly, and also the further lesson
taught by many others that in order to think clearly you must also
write and speak clearly.
That is why we will have need of your skills in the years ahead,
regardless of whether or not you pursue a career in government, in
the private sector, or in some combination of private and public work.
I don't for a moment pretend that there aren't many issues and
questions, or that the answers are easy. Indeed, one of my partners,
Mary Jo White, who served as U.S. Attorney for the district where I
sat as a judge, delivered a speech on some of the issues presented in
these cases, and she called it "Terrorism and Civil Liberties: The
Questions Are Many and the Answers Are Hard."
But your participation, and the participation of others like you,
in the national debate on these and other issues will help assure that
we arrive at conclusions that, as I said, we can all live with. I wish all
of you and each of you the greatest of success in your careers and in
your personal lives, and I thank you again for the opportunity and the
privilege of addressing you today.

